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Abstract—We characterize the secret message capacity of a
wiretapped erasure channel where causal channel state informa-
tion of the honest nodes is publicly available. In doing so, we
establish an intimate connection between message secrecy and
secret key generation for the same channel setup. We propose
a linear coding scheme that has polynomial encoding/decoding
complexity, and prove a converse that shows the optimality of our
scheme. Our work also demonstrates the value of causal public
feedback, which has previously been shown for the secret key
generation problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
We investigate the problem where a node, Alice, wants to
secretly convey a message to another node, Bob, in the pres-
ence of a passive eavesdropper, Eve. Alice can communicate
with Bob using a broadcast erasure channel, but both Bob
and Eve will receive (independently) erased versions of her
transmissions. Additionally, we assume a low capacity public
feedback channel from Bob to Alice that enables Alice to
learn which of her past transmissions were correctly received
by Bob. That is, Alice (and Eve) have causal channel state
information for the channel between Alice and Bob.
The term secrecy capacity is commonly used for either
secret key generation or secret message transmission; however,
there is an important difference between these two. In secret
key generation we require that honest users agree on any
common secret randomness; on the other hand, for secret
message transmission, we require that Bob secretly recovers a
specific message sent by Alice. For clarity, we will use secret
key capacity CK and secret message capacity CSM whenever
we want to emphasize the difference. We are interested in
calculating CSM .
Clearly, the secret key capacity of a channel is an upper
bound for the secret message capacity, i.e., CSM ≤ CK .
This is because for the secret key problem, we are not
constrained by what common randomness Alice and Bob
securely agree upon. In contrast, the message secrecy problem
requires secure delivery of a particular message, which can
also serve as secure common randomness. One natural strategy
is to generate a secret key, use it as a one-time pad to encrypt
the message, and send the encrypted message reliably using
a forward error correcting (FEC) code. An improvement over
this is possible when Eve has a higher erasure probability
than Bob by leveraging secrecy from both the secret key
generated and the channel advantage of Bob over Eve us-
ing the scheme of Yamamoto [1]. However, our capacity-
achieving scheme demonstrates that one can do even better
by exploiting feedback (see Figures 1-2). In particular we
design a hybrid scheme that uses a key to partially encrypt
the message and generates the additional secrecy required from
the channel using feedback. The benefits of our scheme come
from using ARQ (as opposed to FEC or a wiretap code) to
deliver encrypted message packets to Bob. ARQ focuses on
reliable transmission to Bob and hence could repeat (identical)
transmissions, with the result that Eve receives fewer distinct
encrypted message packets. Even when Eve has a lower
erasure probability than Bob, the ARQ scheme ensures that
Bob has a relative advantage over Eve. Therefore feedback
has been used for the purpose of reducing the required key
size by tilting the channel advantage towards Bob.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
overviews related work; Section III describes the channel
model; Section IV provides our main result; Section V gives a
constructive proof of achievability; Section VI proves the the
converse.
II. RELATED WORK
Wyner’s seminal paper [2] calculated the secrecy capacity
of the wiretap channel without feedback. Applied to erasure
channels, this result states that the secrecy capacity is non-
zero only if the honest party has a better channel than the
eavesdropper, i.e., the erasure probability towards Eve is higher
than towards Bob. In this case, there is no difference between
the secret key and the secret message capacity. In contrast,
we show that if we use feedback, this equivalence does not
always hold.
Use of feedback and public discussion can improve the
secrecy capacity, as was first shown by Maurer [3], followed
by more general results for multiple terminals in [4], [5]. All
these results focus on secret key generation, however, a cost-
free public channel with infinite capacity is also available by
assumption. As a result, the secret message capacity is trivially
the same, because the message can be encrypted with the
generated secret key using a one-time-pad and sent securely
on the public channel. In contrast, our setup assumes only
state feedback is available publicly, and there is no other high-
capacity public channel. A similar setup, but with non-causal
state-information available only to the transmitter was studied
in [6], [7] for the Gaussian problem, where some achievability
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schemes based on dirty-paper coding were examined. As far
as we know, this paper presents the first characterization of the
secret message capacity with limited feedback for a non-trivial
setup.
For the broadcast erasure channel with public discussion
a capacity achieving scheme was proposed in [8], [9] for the
group secret key generation problem, where the public channel
is also considered free and unlimited. However in the two-
party special case the secrecy capacity characterized in [3]
specializes easily to requiring only the channel state to be
communicated over the public channel. This observation gives
the secret key capacity for our setup as well; in the sequel we
will focus on the secret message capacity problem.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND NOTATION
We investigate two-party communication in the presence
of an eavesdropping adversary, Eve. The sender Alice wants
to securely send a message W to Bob through a mem-
oryless erasure broadcast channel defined as follows. The
ith input to the channel by Alice is denoted by Xi, and
is a length L vector over Fq. Let us denote Yi and Zi
the ith output of the channel, i.e., the vectors received by
Bob and Eve respectively. We use ⊥ as the symbol of an
erasure. The broadcast channel is conditionally independent,
i.e., Pr{Yi, Zi|Xi} = Pr{Yi|Xi}Pr{Zi|Xi}, and
Pr{Yi|Xi} =
{
1− δ, Yi = Xi
δ, Yi =⊥,
Pr{Zi|Xi} =
{
1− δE , Zi = Xi
δE , Zi =⊥ .
The probabilities δ, δE are assumed to be known by all parties.
The notation X i will be used to denote (X1, X2, . . . , Xi)
and Xji to denote (Xi, Xi+1, . . . , Xj). Let Si denote the
random variable that describes the state of Bob’s channel at the
ith transmission. Si is a random variable on values in {B, ∅},
where Pr{Si = B} = 1− δ meaning Bob correctly received
the ith packet. We model the feedback channel as Alice and
Eve having access causally to the channel states, i.e. before
the ith transmission they both know the vector Si−1. We also
allow private randomness at all nodes. We denote by U the
private randomness of Alice.
Definition 1. We say that RSM is an achievable secret
message rate if for any " > 0 and sufficiently large n the
following conditions hold for some functions fi(·),WB(·):
Xi = fi(W,U, S
i−1), i = 1, 2, . . . , n, (1)
where the message W is uniformly distributed over
{1, 2, . . . , 2n(RSM−!)}. Bob is able to recover W with high
probability:
Wˆ =WB(Y
n), (2)
Pr{Wˆ %=W} < ". (3)
Eve gains negligible useful information:
I(W ;ZnSn) < ". (4)
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Figure 1. Secret message and secret key capacities with and without state-
feedback for δ = 0.4. The rates achieved using FEC and Yamamoto’s scheme
are also plotted.
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Figure 2. Secret message and secret key capacities for δ = δE together with
the rate achieved using FEC (or Yamamoto’s scheme).
Definition 2. The supremum of all achievable secret message
rates is the secret message capacity of the channel denoted by
CSM .
IV. MAIN RESULT
The following theorem is the main result of this paper.
Theorem 1. The secret message capacity of the wiretapped
erasure channel with state-feedback is
CSM = (1− δ)δE 1− δδE
1− δδ2E
L log q.
For comparison we plot the secret message and the secret
key capacity together with the secrecy capacity when no
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feedback is available for some special parameter values. We
plot secret message rates achieved using FEC and Yamamoto’s
scheme as well. For simplicity we set L = 1, q = 2. Figures 1-
2 show the gap between the secret message and the secret key
capacities as well as the benefit that state-feedback provides.
We derive the secret message capacity of the described channel
in two steps: we first propose a coding scheme for secret
message sending, and then give the converse proof.
V. ACHIEVABILITY SCHEME
For simplicity, we assume that the message W can be
divided into N packets W1,W2, . . . ,WN each of size L log q.
Our scheme has two phases as follows:
1) Key setup: A common secret key is set up between Alice
and Bob. The size of this key is (in units of L log q)
K =M +M3/4, (5)
where M = N 1− δE
1− δδE . (6)
2) Message transmission: Our scheme uses a mix of a one-
time pad with the key generated in the first phase and secrecy
obtained by the noisy erasure broadcast. In particular, we
linearly mix the pure message packets with encrypted message
packets using a one-time-pad with the key. This mixture is then
sent to Bob using an ARQ scheme, i.e. each packet is repeated
until Bob receives it. Eve will receive fewer distinct packets
under this ARQ scheme compared to a FEC erasure coding
scheme which ignores the state feedback.
In the following, we describe the two phases in detail.
1) Key setup: The capacity achieving scheme for the secret
key generation problem is given in [3], [8], [9]. We utilize
this as the first phase of our scheme. For convenience, we
summarize the main steps here:
• Alice sends n′ packets selected independently from FLq
uniformly at random. In expectation, Bob correctly re-
ceives n′(1− δ) packets, out of which n′(1− δ)δE are
not received by Eve.
• By assumption, Alice knows exactly the packets that Bob
correctly received. Both Alice and Bob create the same
n′((1 − δ)δE − "′) linear combinations of Bob’s packets.
For this, the parity check matrix of an MDS code is
utilized to ensure that resulting packets are independent
and their encoding vector has sufficiently large weight.
The resulting packets are concatenated and can be used
as a secret key.
The amount of secret key generated by this scheme is
n′((1 − δ)δE − "′)L log q.
The secrecy is in the sense of (4) with security parameter
"′. For proofs and details we refer the reader to [8], [9].
2) Message transmission: From the properties of the first
phase we may assume that Alice and Bob have common keys
K = (K1,K2, . . . ,KK) each of size L log q that are secret
from Eve1.
Alice does the following:
1The loss from treating K as an integer is negligible.
1) She encrypts a part of the message using one-time-pad:
W ′ =WK ⊕K. (7)
2) The resulting partially encrypted message [W ′, WNK+1]
is then encoded using a generator matrix G =
[
G1
G2
]
.
The encoded block is then
W =W ′G1 +WNK+1G2.
G is a publicly known full-rank N×N matrix such that
G1 is the generator matrix of an (N,K) MDS code.
3) The columns (W1,W2, . . . ,WN) of W are transmitted
to Bob using ARQ. Formally, given that n′ is the length
of the first (key-generation) phase,
Xn′+1 = W1; Xn′+i+1 =
{
Xi = Wj , if Sn′+i = ∅
Wj+1, if Sn′+i = B.
If all the columns have not been received by Bob before
the end of the blocklength n defined below, the protocol
terminates and an error is declared. Let
n = n′ + n′′ + n′′
3/4
, (8)
where n′′ = N
1− δ . (9)
Theorem 2. The scheme described above achieves a secret
message rate of
RSM = (1− δ)δE 1− δδE1− δδ2E
L log q.
Proof: Let us first investigate conditions (1)-(4). Out of
these, (1) is trivially satisfied by the scheme. Next, we prove
that the secrecy condition (4) also holds.
First, note that by construction (and by the properties of
the scheme for key setup), anything that Eve learns during
the first phase is independent of the message and practically
independent of all packets sent during the second phase. From
this it follows that it is sufficient to investigate the second
phase only. Thus
I(W ;ZnSn) = I(W ;Zn
′
Sn
′WII) = I(W ;WI |Zn′Sn′I),
where WI are the columns of W Eve overhears, and I is the
set of indices of these overheard columns. Notice that
H(WI |Zn′Sn′ , I = i) ≤ |i|L log q.
Moreover, from the MDS property of the G1 matrix, we have
H(WI |WZn′Sn′ , I = i) = H(KG(i)1 |Zn
′
Sn
′
)
= H(KG(i)1 )− I(KG(i)1 ;Zn
′
Sn
′
)
≥ min(|i|,K)L log q − "′,
where G(i)1 is the G1 matrix restricted to the columns indexed
by i. Here, "′ is the security parameter from the key-generation
scheme. Hence,
I(W ;ZnSn) ≤
N∑
m=0
Pr{|I| = m}max(0,m−K)L log q + "′
≤ Pr{|I| ≥ K}NL log q + "′.
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Now, we need a concentration result for |I| by using the
erasure channel probabilities and our ARQ strategy. By in-
specting the ARQ scheme, the probability that a given column
is received correctly by Eve is
p = (1− δE) + δδE(1− δE) + · · · = 1− δE
1− δδE .
Then, |I| can be seen as the sum of N independent ran-
dom variables on {0, 1} drawn from a Bernoulli distribution
Ber(p). So, we have that
E[|I|] = N 1− δE
1− δδE =M. (10)
Moreover, from the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound
Pr{|I| ≥ K} = Pr
{
|I| ≥M +M3/4
}
≤ exp
(
−
√
M
4
)
.
From this concentration result we get
I(W ;ZnSn) ≤ exp
(
−
√
M
4
)
NL log q + "′. (11)
By choosing N (and at the same time M ) sufficiently large
and using (6), we may satisfy (4).
To show (2)-(3), notice that if Bob receives all the columns
of W in the second phase, then since G is full rank, he can
decode [W ′, WNK+1]. From the first phase, Bob knows K, so
by (7) he can decode W . The probability that the protocol
terminates before Bob receives all the columns can be made
arbitrarily small: To see this, notice that since the expected
number of transmissions for each column of W so that Bob
receives it is 1/(1− δ), the average number of transmissions
in an unterminated protocol which continues till Bob receives
all the columns is n′′ = N/(1 − δ). Now we can employ
Chernoff-Hoeffding bound to argue that the probability that
our protocol terminates before Bob receives all the columns
can be made arbitrarily small by a large enough choice of
N [10, Problem 2.4]. It only remains to calculate the rate.
The rate of communication achieved is
N
n
=
N
n′ + n′′ + n′′3/4
=
N
K
δE(1−δ)−!′
+ N1−δ +
N3/4
(1−δ)3/4
.
Substituting for K from (5)-(6), it is easy to see that for a
sufficiently large choice of N this can be made arbitrarily
close to RSM in the theorem statement.
VI. CONVERSE
We give a matching upper bound on the achievable secret
message rate. To prove the converse part, we will assume
that the channel state of Eve is also known publicly. Hence,
in this part Si ∈ {B,E,EB, ∅}. The four possible outcomes
refer to correct receptions by: “Bob only”, “Eve only”,“Eve &
Bob” and “Neither” respectively. Clearly, this extension could
only increase the achievable secret message rate, thus an upper
bound in this model is valid in the original channel also.
We are going to use the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1. If I(W ;ZnSn) < ", then
n∑
i=1
I(W ;Xi|Zi−1Si−1) < "
1− δE
Proof:
" > I(W ;ZnSn) =
n∑
i=1
I(W ;ZiSi|Zi−1Si−1)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W ;Zi|Zi−1Si−1Si) (12)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W ;Zi|Zi−1Si−1Si ∈ {E,EB})·
· Pr{Si ∈ {E,EB}} (13)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W ;Xi|Zi−1Si−1Si ∈ {E,EB})(1− δE) (14)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W ;Xi|Zi−1Si−1)(1 − δE) (15)
Here, (12) comes from the fact that Si is independent of W,Zi
and Si−1. To get (13) we exploit that the mutual information is
0 if Zi =⊥. Given Si ∈ {E,EB}, Zi = Xi, this results (14).
Then, we use again the independence of Si to get (15). This
concludes the proof.
Lemma 2. In the described model, if conditions (1)-(4) are
satisfied, then
n∑
i=1
I(W ;Xi|Y i−1Zi−1Si−1) ≥ nRSM
1− δδE
The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 1 and is omitted.
Next, we state the converse theorem.
Theorem 3. For the achievable secret message rate as defined
in Def. 1 it holds that
RSM ≤ (1− δ)δE 1− δδE1− δδ2E
L log q.
Proof:
nRSM ≤ I(W ;Y nSn) =
n∑
i=1
I(W ;YiSi|Y i−1Si−1)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W ;Yi|Y i−1Si−1Si)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W ;Yi|Y i−1Si−1Si ∈ {B,EB})·
· Pr{Si ∈ {B,EB}}
= (1− δ)
n∑
i=1
I(W ;Xi|Y i−1Si−1)
= (1− δ)
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|Y i−1Si−1)−H(Xi|Y i−1Si−1W )
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≤ (1− δ)
(
nL log q −
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|Y i−1Si−1W )
)
≤ (1− δ)
(
nL log q −
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|Y i−1Zi−1Si−1W )
)
(16)
So far, besides basic information equalities and inequalities
we used the same properties as in the proof of Lemma 1.
As the next step in our proof, we are going to bound the
term
∑n
i=1H(Xi|Y i−1Zi−1Si−1W ) separately. Observe the
following:
0 ≤ H(Y nSn|ZnSnW ) =
= H(Y n−1Sn−1|ZnSnW ) +H(YnSn|Y n−1ZnSnW )
= H(Y n−1Sn−1|Zn−1Sn−1W )
− I(Y n−1Sn−1;ZnSn|Zn−1Sn−1W )
+H(Yn|Y n−1ZnSnW )
= H(Y n−1Sn−1|Zn−1Sn−1W )
− I(Y n−1Sn−1;Zn|Zn−1Sn−1SnW )
+H(Yn|Y n−1ZnSnW )
= H(Y n−1Sn−1|Zn−1Sn−1W )
− I(Y n−1Sn−1;Zn|Zn−1Sn−1W,Sn ∈ {E,EB})·
· Pr{Sn ∈ {E,EB}}
+H(Yn|Y n−1ZnSn−1W,Sn = B) Pr{Sn = B}
+H(Yn|Y n−1ZnSn−1W,Sn = EB) Pr{Sn = EB}
= H(Y n−1Sn−1|Zn−1Sn−1W )
− I(Y n−1Sn−1;Xn|Zn−1Sn−1W )(1 − δE)
+H(Xn|Y n−1Zn−1Sn−1W )(1 − δ)δE
+H(Xn|Y n−1Zn−1XnSn−1W )(1 − δ)(1− δE)
= H(Y n−1Sn−1|Zn−1Sn−1W )
− I(Y n−1Sn−1;Xn|Zn−1Sn−1W )(1 − δE)
+H(Xn|Y n−1Zn−1Sn−1W )(1 − δ)δE
Again, all we needed was the independence property of Sn.
We can perform the same steps recursively to obtain:
(1− δ)δE
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|Y i−1Zi−1Si−1W ) ≥
(1− δE)
n∑
i=1
I(Y n−1Sn−1;Xn|Zn−1Sn−1W ) (17)
We further bound
∑n
i=1 I(Y
n−1Sn−1;Xn|Zn−1Sn−1W ):
n∑
i=1
I(Y n−1Sn−1;Xn|Zn−1Sn−1W )
=
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|Zi−1Si−1W )−H(Xi|Y i−1Zi−1Si−1W )
=
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|Zi−1Si−1)−H(Xi|Y i−1Zi−1Si−1W )
− I(W ;Xi|Zi−1Si−1)
≥
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|Y i−1Zi−1Si−1)−H(Xi|Y i−1Zi−1Si−1W )
− I(Xi;W |Zi−1Si−1)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W ;Xi|Y i−1Zi−1Si−1)− I(W ;Xi|Zi−1Si−1)
>
nRSM
1− δδE −
"
1− δE (18)
To get (18) we made use of our two lemmas. Now, we can
put together (16)-(18) and get:
nRSM < (1− δ)
(
nL log q − (1 − δE)nRSM
(1 − δδE)(1− δ)δE+
+
"
(1− δ)δE
)
Rearranging terms gives:
RSM < (1 − δ)δE 1− δδE
1− δδ2E
L log q +
"(1− δδE)
n(1− δδ2E)
(19)
Number " can be chosen arbitrary small, so we are done.
Note that (19) shows that the converse is true for a weaker
security condition 1nI(W ;Z
nSn) < " as well.
Theorems 2-3 together provide the proof for Theorem 1.
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